The outer right has no coalition, even if it appears all of its component organizations are coordinating.
Part of the reason for this is egoism, but part is also a negotiating gambit among the people who resist forming alliances.
Generally, people writing and speaking on these issues have a special interest. They want to make sure that their special interest will not be downgraded if they collaborate with other people who either don’t share that interest, or don’t have that interest as their foremost concern.
To form a useful coalition, each of its members has to be willing to put aside some of their pet issues for some time, at least in the particular context of presenting a united front on a single issue, even if it’s temporary.
Part of the reason why Europe and its descendants have been so successful relative to other parts of the world is the unusual cultural capacity of Europeans to devolve and delegate authority to lower levels, to set strategic goals at a high level and then to use a high-trust culture to enable people closer to the ground to act on their own initiative.
In return, broadly spread property rights enable greater shares in the profits, as risk is similarly shared throughout the population.
Property rights are always present, even in the most despotic societies, although the sphere of protection that they represent is more restricted. Even in despotism, property rights are enforced within the limits of the imperial palace. When property rights are spread throughout society, recognized as social norms, and enforced predictably, the society can be more active and responsive to changing conditions. Decision making loops can become tighter and faster, rather than being regulated by a single decision loop in the imperial capitol.
Setting up a structure that is capable of making faster, better-informed decisions than the competition is an effective way to crush a competitor, no matter how small the starting point is. If you can make 1,000 effective decisions in the same time that it takes the competitor to make 1, then the defeat of the competitor is almost inevitable.
A culture based on decentralized leadership will defeat a consensus-based culture routinely, because reaching consensus takes exponentially greater amounts of time depending on the scale of the organization that must be brought to consensus.
For the outer right to become an effective force in politics, people need to be able to bargain without giving up the essence of what they want to preserve. Without the need to appeal to an entire society of hundreds of millions, it’s possible to form more effective groups that don’t require the surrender of every important point in the pursuit of winning an election.
It’s much easier to build a smaller culture of millions from the defectors of the mass-culture than it is to try to go after an entire mass-culture at once which has no interest in defection.
The aim shouldn’t be to form a counter-culture, but to create a viable alternative culture with all the trappings of a self-sustaining culture. Once that is on solid footing, then the other components fall into place. Counter-culture defines itself as the opposite of the culture that it opposes, ceding the opposition the frame of discussion immediately. A competing culture defines itself, with its opposition to the neighboring culture being a secondary matter.